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Abstract

Many countries use aid as a political tool, but Japan is unique in that foreign aid is
one of its most important foreign policy tools. Drawing from literature on donor
motivations for aid-giving, this paper argues that the neo-realist view of aid-giving offers
the best explanation for why Japan provides aid. More specifically, Japan’s aid-giving is
motivated by its pursuit of economic and strategic goals. This underlying motive for aidgiving necessarily impacts how Japan provides aid and how it uses aid to respond to
human rights violations in recipient countries.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Japan became an unofficial aid donor in 1954, when it began providing
reparations to Asian countries affected by World War II (Leheny, 2010). Japan quickly
expanded its aid program beyond these countries, contributing $50,000 to the Colombo
Plan in 1954 and providing its first aid loan in 1958 (Fujikura & Nakayama, 2016;
Lancaster 2007). Japan’s aid program remained relatively small up until the 1970s, when
rapid economic growth and U.S. pressure motivated Japan to expand its program. Japan’s
aid program continued to expand in the 1980s, and, in 1989, Japan became the world’s
largest aid provider (Lancaster, 2007). However, its position at the top was short-lived.
Due to the depreciation of the yen and a prolonged economic downturn caused by a rapid
decline in asset prices in 1990, Japan decreased its aid from a high of $14 billion in 1995
to $9.4 billion in 1996. These cuts to aid pushed Japan to second place, and further cuts
put Japan in fourth place, where it currently sits today (Jain, 2016).
Although Japan is no longer the largest aid donor, aid is still a major part of
Japan’s foreign policy, especially since Japan lacks a conventional military (Furuoka,
2006; Yamamoto, 2017). Given the importance of aid in Japan’s foreign policy, this
paper seeks to provide an explanation for why Japan gives aid. Answering this question
will offer insight into Japan’s approach to aid-giving and foreign policy more generally.
It will also contribute to scholarly understanding of what motivates Japan’s aid policy
vis-a-vis human rights issues.
Japan appears to have an aid program that is committed to promoting human
rights in recipient countries. Following the Cold War, donor countries no longer felt
1

obligated to support corrupt or oppressive regimes simply because they were pro-Western
or capitalist (Moyo, 2010). Consequently, donors began using aid to promote good
governance, which included strong institutions, lack of corruption, transparent laws, and
human rights protections (Furuoka, 2005; Moyo, 2010).
Japan was criticized in the 1990s for its seeming reluctance to follow this trend
and its “mercantilist” aid orientation. In response to these critiques, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) adopted a new Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter
in 1992, which made the promotion of human rights and democracy a key priority
(Furuoka, 2005). The fourth principle of the charter states:
Full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and
introduction of a market-orientated economy, and the situation regarding
the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient countries.
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA], 1992)
Following this revision, Japan imposed 12 negative aid sanctions and 13 positive aid
sanctions on recipient countries between 1992 and 2002 (Oishi & Fumitaka, 2003).
Another revision to the charter in 2003 added that the objectives of ODA are to
“contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to
help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity” (MOFA, 2003, p.1). The 2003 Charter
emphasizes the strategic uses of ODA, but the fourth principle of the 1992 Charter was
not altered. When the charter was revised again in 2015, it still stated that Japan would
pay attention to “situations regarding the consolidation of democratization, the rule of
law and the protection of basic human rights” in recipient countries and aim to promote
these three conditions (MOFAa, 2015, p.8). The continued commitment to human rights
2

conditionality expressed in the aid charters suggests that promoting human rights is a
major component of the Japan’s aid program. However, Japan provides aid to countries
like Cambodia and the Philippines with major human rights issues. In the Philippines, for
example, President Rodrigo Duterte is waging a “war on drugs” involving the
extrajudicial killing of alleged drug dealers and users (Human Rights Watch [HRW],
2017). This paper will show how the discrepancy between Japan’s stated ODA principles
and its actions are connected to the interests that motivate Japan’s aid-giving in the first
place.
This paper argues that Japan provides aid in order to secure its economic and
strategic interests. More specifically, Japan’s aid program is driven by the pursuit of
economic growth through trade and economic ties with Southeast Asian countries. The
program is driven by the pursuit of strategic interests such as maritime security and
maintaining strong diplomatic ties with Southeast Asian countries. Japan’s neorealist
orientation explains its apparent reluctance to impose aid sanctions on strategically
important countries, like the Philippines, when these countries violate human rights. Thus,
although Japan may express a commitment to monitoring and promoting human rights
conditions in recipient countries, like most countries, Japan prioritizes its relationships
with these countries over human rights considerations.
The paper begins with a brief review of the literature on donor behavior and
Japan’s behavior as a donor. Chapter 2 explains the first element of the neorealist
argument: Japan’s economic interests. This chapter shows that Japan’s desire for
economic growth leads Tokyo to direct the majority of its aid to infrastructure
development in Southeast Asia. However, while the economic self-interest explanation
3

for Japan’s aid-giving is still relevant, it is ultimately insufficient for explaining Japan’s
motivations. Chapter 3 explores the second element of the neorealist argument, Japan’s
strategic motivations. It demonstrates that changes in Japan’s aid charter and key
legislative changes have expanded the focus of Japan’s aid program in order to address
security and diplomatic issues. Finally, the paper shows that Japan’s pursuit of economic
and strategic interests, through relationships with important countries, informs how and
when Japan leverages its aid to promote human rights. The chapter also discusses the
prospects of Japan leveraging its bargaining power to induce changes in human rights
conditions in light of China’s rise as an aid donor.

Literature Review
The first step toward understanding why Japan gives aid is examining why
countries give aid in general. There is a wide range of views regarding states’ motivations
for giving aid, but they can be organized into four broad categories of thought: realist,
Marxist constructivist, and liberal. In addition, there are a number of empirical studies
that identify a range of motivations for giving aid. In this paper, foreign aid, foreign
assistance, and ODA will be used interchangeably to refer to “all resources – physical
goods, skills and technical know-how, financial grants (gifts), or loans (at concessional
rates) – transferred by donors to recipients” (Riddell, 2007, p.17).
Realists argue that, in an anarchic world system governed by self-interest, aid is
driven by a state’s pursuit of their strategic interests, particularly political and military
ones (Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998). Liska describes aid as a form of economic
power that states use to win over uncommitted countries to their “side,” thereby
improving their position of power in the global system and enhancing their security
4

(1960). In his analysis of foreign aid motivations, Liska uses qualitative methods to
explain the U.S.’s use of aid as a tool for advancing its short-term and long-term security
interests. More recent studies, such as the one conducted by Alesina and Dollar, provide
quantitative support for Liska’s assertions and their applicability to other countries. In
their study of bilateral aid provisions, Alesina and Dollar determine that political and
economic interests play a major role in states’ decisions to provide aid. They also find
that colonial past and political alliances are particularly large determinants of aid
provision (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). Younas comes to a similar conclusion in his analysis
of aid determinants for member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). He finds that a donor country’s trade relations, as well as its
political and security interests, have a large influence on its aid allocations (Younas,
2008).
The Marxist view assumes that states base aid provision on their economic
interests. There are many schools of Marxist thought, from classical and neo-Marxism, to
dependency and world systems theories (Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998). A common
feature of these theories is the characterization of foreign aid as a tool of Western
imperialism that dominant states in the global capitalist system use to “control and
exploit developing countries” (Liska, 1969; Lancaster, 2007). U.S. foreign aid, for
example, is used to open up new markets and provide support for governments that are
friendly to the U.S. (Hayter, 1981). According to the Marxist view, aid may bring some
benefits to recipient countries, but aid is ultimately provided to advance donors’ interests.
The Marxist and realist views share a similar perspective on the relationship between
self-interest and aid, but differ in their judgement of this relationship. Marxists condemn
5

the exploitative nature of aid-giving, while realists present it as a natural outgrowth of the
anarchic international system.
In contrast to the Marxist and realist perspectives, constructivist or idealist
explanations emphasize the role of altruism and humanitarianism in the decision to
provide aid (Veen, 2011). Constructivists argue that the core beliefs and identity of
donors, which are derived from cultural traditions, inform aid-giving (Veen, 2011). States
may provide aid out of a sense of obligation to help poorer countries, guilt over past
colonialism, or a generally accepted belief that more advanced countries should help less
developed countries with economic development (Veen, 2011). Lumsdaine argues that
states, like humans, are not solely motivated by self-interest and desire for power. Rather,
foreign aid provision is also shaped by humanitarian and egalitarian convictions (1993).
Using data from the OECD on aid commitments, Berthélemy identifies countries that
display altruistic aid-giving, meaning they give based on recipient need and merit, and
egotistic countries that give based on self-interest (2006). He finds that Denmark,
Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, and Ireland are more altruistic in their
aid-giving, while Australia, France, Italy, the U.S., and Japan are primarily motivated by
self-interest (geopolitical, commercial, financial, etc.) (Berthélemy, 2006). In a similar
study, Schraeder & Stokke identifies Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, and the
Netherlands as countries that provide aid on the basis of “humane internationalism”
(1990). Humane or humanitarian internationalism combines a sense of moral obligation
to reduce poverty in developing countries with the belief that a more equal distribution of
resources will serve their interests in the long-run (Degnbol-Martinussen & EngbergPedersen, 2003). By acknowledging that states may be motivated by both moral
6

obligation and enlightened self-interest, constructivists co-opt elements of the realist
explanation and shield their arguments from being immediately dismissed as unrealistic.
Proponents of the liberal view contend that states use aid to cooperate on
problems related to interdependence and globalization. Packenham characterizes aid as
both a means to increase cooperation by promoting economic and political development
and an instrument of cooperation in and of itself (1973). The liberal view assumes that
countries will become more cooperative as trade and finance linkages increase and
democratic norms spread (Mingst & Snyder, 2017). Aid is also meant to increase
international “public goods” such as containing epidemics and addressing environmental
issues (Lancaster, 2007).
Liberal internationalism is another iteration of the liberal view. Liberal
internationalists argue that states are motivated by the desire to promote economic and
social development in recipient countries; the desire for political stability in recipient
countries; and the desire for export promotion (Chenery & Strout, 1966). This strand of
liberal thought incorporates elements of the constructivist arguments and, in some
sources, the two explanations appear indistinguishable (Sato & Asano, 2008). This paper
treats them as separate explanations, as liberal explanations emphasize the desire to
promote cooperation and democracy as a motivation for aid, while constructivist
explanations emphasize humanitarianism.
Finally, recent data-driven approaches to the question of donor motivations
maintain that countries are influenced by a range of motives. Which motives hold more
weight differs from country to country. Riddell identifies six categories of motives for
giving aid: addressing emergency needs; helping countries achieve development goals;
7

showing solidarity; achieving strategic interests; helping promote commercial interests of
the donor; and historical ties (2007). Veen classifies the goals of aid-giving into seven
categories: security, power and influence, economic self-interest, enlightened self-interest,
self-affirmation, reputation, duty and obligation, and humanitarianism (2011). Lancaster
offers a more concise categorization of motives, arguing that foreign aid is used for four
main purposes: “diplomatic, development, humanitarian relief, and commercial” (2007).
Similarly, Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen argue that national security
considerations, economic considerations, moral and humanitarian principles, and
environmental considerations are the most important motives for aid-giving (2003).
These studies do not fall into a specific school of thought, as they do not provide an
overarching theory about aid-giving. However, they provide valuable insight into
motivations for aid-giving on a country-by-country basis. The studies are especially
useful when they comment on the dominant motivations for specific countries, as
Lancaster does.
Focusing specifically on Japan, the most popular explanations for why Japan
provides foreign aid are as follows: Japan is motivated by economic self-interest; Japan
provides aid to bolster alliances and its geopolitical standing; Japan is motivated by both
strategic and economic interests; and Japan provides aid for altruistic reasons, namely to
promote world peace, human rights, and democracy, and to alleviate poverty. These
explanations will be referred to as the economic self-interest argument, the realist
argument, the neorealist argument, and the constructivist argument, respectively.
The economic self-interest argument is one of the most popular explanations for
Japan’s aid policy post-WWII (Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998). Proponents of this
8

view argue that Japan uses aid to encourage trade and investment through infrastructure
development (Arase, 1995). The commercial motive for aid-giving was most evident in
the 1960s and 1970s when Japanese aid was “tied,” meaning aid recipients could only
acquire equipment and services from Japanese companies (Takahashi & Jain, 2000).
Researchers such as Ensign argue that, based on procurement statistics, Japan’s aid
continued to be commercially driven well past the 1970s (1992). Schraeder, Hook, and
Taylor draw a similar conclusion based on their analysis of Japanese aid patterns to
African countries in the 1980s. Their study shows a positive relationship between aid and
trade levels, indicating that Japanese aid mainly went to countries that Japan traded with
or wanted to trade with (Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998). Arase is another proponent of
the economic self-interest argument. He acknowledges that Japanese aid has been used
for diplomatic purposes, but argues that aid is primarily meant to serve Japan’s economic
and commercial interests (Arase, 1995). Koppel and Orr offer a more nuanced variation
on the economic self-interest argument. They contend that the central theme of Japan’s
ODA policy is economic cooperation offered to countries of “strategic, economic, or
humanitarian” interest to Japan, in order to strengthen these countries’ self-help abilities
for industrialization and economic development; strengthen Japan’s economic relations
with these countries; and strengthen Japan’s security by reducing international instability
and ensuring access to vital resources (1993). Variations on this theme can be attributed
to Japan’s specific bilateral relationship with a country, constraints imposed by local
conditions, limits on Japan’s capabilities, and Japan’s cautious approach to globalization
(Koppel & Orr, 1993).
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Realist explanations emphasize Japan’s geopolitical and alliance considerations
over its economic interests (Sato & Asano, 2008). In their 2000 study, Alesina and Dollar
found that countries that voted with Japan in the UN tended to receive more aid. This
correlation could indicate UN vote buying, but the voting patterns most likely reflect
political alliances. They see this correlation as evidence that strategic considerations are a
major factor in Japanese aid allocation (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). Sato and Asano come to
a similar conclusion in their analysis of the casual relationship between three types of
Japanese ODA and twelve independent variables that were grouped into three theoretical
positions (realist, mercantilist, and liberal). Out of the three perspectives, they found that
realist factors played the most significant role in aid allocation and that “mercantilist”
factors were in decline (Sato & Asano, 2008).
The realist explanation includes the argument that Japan’s aid provision is
influenced by external pressure (gaiatsu) from the U.S. (Orr, 1990). Japan relies on the
U.S. for security, and Japanese multinational corporations rely on continued access to
U.S. markets. Therefore, it is in Japan’s security and economic interests to maintain a
positive relationship with the U.S. (Tuman, 2009). Supporting the U.S.’s security and
economic agenda through aid provision is one way of maintaining this alliance. Orr traces
Japan’s use of aid for alliance maintenance back to the “Nixon shock” in the 1970s.
Nixon decided to visit to China without consulting Japan, and he imposed a U.S.
embargo on soybeans exports, which negatively impacted Japan. These events showed
Japan that a) the U.S. would pursue its own interests, even to the detriment of Japan and
b) Japan would have to contribute more to the U.S.-Japan relationship in order for its
interests to be given more weight (Orr, 1990). In lieu of military resources, Japan used
10

aid as a tool to improve international development and stability in Asia. Aid allocation
also created a more receptive environment for the expansion of Japanese economic
activity (Orr, 1990). Proponents of the gaiatsu viewpoint cite Japan’s decision to give aid
to countries like Egypt and Turkey, which are of strategic importance to the U.S., as
proof of Japan’s continued responsiveness to pressure from the U.S. (Sato & Hirata,
2008). The U.S. and Japan continue to enjoy a strong security and economic relationship,
but scholars disagree on the degree to which pressure from the U.S. influences Japan’s
foreign policy decisions in the post-Cold War era (Potter & Sueo, 2003).
The neorealist explanation emphasizes both economic and strategic interests as
drivers of aid-giving (Sato & Hirata, 2008). Hook and Zhang argue that Japan seemed to
adopt a new approach to aid in the 1990s that went beyond geo-economic self-interest. In
reality, however, Japan continued to provide aid on the basis of its economic and security
interests (Hook & Zhang, 1998). They point to Japan’s selective use of aid sanctions
against countries such as China, India, and Pakistan, which threatened regional stability
through nuclear testing, as evidence of the security dimension of aid (Hook & Zhang,
1998). Rix, Lancaster, and Riddell also adopt the neorealist view, but include the
preservation or improvement of national image as a key motivation. According to Rix,
Japan uses aid to reduce its vulnerability to resource scarcity, foreign criticism, and shifts
in the “international economic climate” (Rix, 2010). Lancaster cites an annual ODA
report from 1997, which links Japan’s aid provision to taking an “honored place” in the
international system, as evidence of the relationship between Japan’s aid-giving and its
national image (Lancaster, 2007).
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Jain also highlights the relationship between Japan’s aid program and the pursuit
of national interests. In the 2000s, Japanese officials realized that aid expenditures needed
to be justified to the domestic public in the face of sluggish economic growth and
national budget cuts (Jain, 2014b). This new understanding appears in government
documents such as the 2003 ODA Charter, which portrays Japan’s aid program as
something that will serve Japan’s national interests and contribute to “peace and
development of the international community” (Jain, 2014b; MOFA, 2003). Neorealists do
not dispute that Japanese officials may care about issues such as poverty alleviation and
human rights or that recipient countries can benefit from ODA programs. They also do
not claim that Japan’s aid program is only driven by self-interest. Rather, neorealists
argue that the pursuit of economic prosperity and strategic interests (security, strategic
allies, etc.) is the most salient motivation for Japan’s aid-giving (Jain, 2016).
Constructivists argue that Japan provides aid because it feels obligated to
contribute to the international community. Aid is seen as a way to contribute to conflict
prevention and peace building. Akiko argues that measures such as the ODA doubling
plan, the untying of bilateral aid, and the provision of aid to Sub-Saharan Africa indicate
Japan is committed to fostering world peace (Takahashi & Jain, 2000). In their study of
Japan’s aid disbursement to 86 countries from 1979 to 2002, Tuman, Strand, and Emmert
find that gaiatsu and economic interests are not strong determinants of allocation. Rather,
aid is concentrated in poor countries that do not trade with Japan or have oil (2009). Kim
and Potter present a hybrid realist-constructivist explanation for Japan’s aid, arguing that
aid has become both more security-orientated and more concerned with humanitarian
issues (Kim & Potter, 2013). The constructivist argument and other explanations are not
12

mutually exclusive, and incorporating constructivist elements into these explanations
could provide insight into Japan’s aid provisions to African countries that are not
strategically important to Japan.
The following chapters will show that the neorealist view is the most compelling
explanation for why Japan provides aid. Japan’s aid program is motivated by a
combination of economic and strategic interests. The neorealist view also explains
Japan’s aversion to imposing aid sanctions on strategically and economically important
countries.

13

Chapter 2

Japan’s Economic Interests
Japan has a history of using aid to pursue its economic interests, chief among
them economic development. Under the San Francisco Treaty, Japan provided
reparations to help rebuild infrastructure in Asian countries affected by World War II
(Asplund & Söderberg, 2017). Consequently, Tokyo signed reparations agreements with
Myanmar in 1955, the Philippines in 1956, Indonesia in 1958, and Vietnam in 1960. 1
Japan’s program may have started as reparations, but it quickly became a tool to further
Japan’s economic development (Arase, 1995). For example, per recipient request, Japan
provided reparations in the form of hydropower plants, paper plants, and other
infrastructure projects rather than consumer goods (Fujikura & Nakayama, 2016). In
order to manage the distribution of these capital goods, Japan instituted a “request-based”
system in which Japanese firms in recipient countries would identify a project and
present it to recipient governments. The recipient government would then ask the
Japanese government to fund the project. Once the Japanese government approved the
project, the same Japanese companies would implement the project (Lancaster, 2007).
This arrangement helped expand the exports of Japanese companies and led to the
production of raw materials such as minerals and lumber that Japan would then import
from the recipient country (Lancaster, 2007; Arase, 1995).
In addition to reparations, Japan introduced yen loans and used them, in
conjunction with foreign direct investment, to promote exports from infant industries.

1

The agreements with each country eventually expired - Vietnam and Myanmar in 1965; Indonesia in
1970; and the Philippines in 1976- but these countries remain the top recipients of Japanese aid (Fujikura &
Nakayama, 2016).
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Japan made a $50,000 contribution to the Colombo plan in 1954 and its first yen loan to
India in 1958 (Fujikura & Nakayama, 2016; Lancaster, 2007). As Japan moved up into
the ranks of industrialized countries, the focus of Japan’s aid expanded to address issues
such as diplomacy and energy security (Lancaster, 2007). Yet, even as the focus of its aid
program expanded, economic interests remained the primary focus of the program and
remained so throughout the 1980s (Arase, 1995). In the 1980s, aid was used to promote
foreign direct investment and facilitate the movement of labor-intensive industries to
Asian countries (Arase, 1995). Moving these industries to Asia enabled Japan to import
manufactured goods from Asia and focus on developing high-value, knowledge-based
industries domestically (Arase, 1995).
While the primacy of economic interests in Japan’s aid program diminished in the
1990s, this chapter argues that Japan’s aid-giving is still largely motivated by its desire
for economic growth. In 2013, the government introduced a strategy of export-driven
economic growth as part of its effort to bring the country out of its prolonged economic
slump (Yoshimatsu, 2017; Okuda, 2015). The strategy consists of the government
providing aid loans to recipient countries, mainly in Southeast Asia, for infrastructure
development. Measures such as “tying” loans to Japanese businesses ensure that recipient
countries choose Japanese companies to carry out the infrastructure projects. These
companies complete the projects using infrastructure systems from Japan, which exports
from Japan and, in theory, contributes to Japan’s GDP (Yoshimatsu, 2017). 2 In addition,
by improving infrastructure in recipient countries, the companies further facilitate trade

2

In this paper, the term “infrastructure systems” refers to the technology and general materials used to
create infrastructure such as railways, roads, bridges, ports, airports, and energy structures (Hornung &
Reeves, 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA], 2015b).
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between Japan and recipient countries (Wallace, 2018). Assuming that aid allocations are
a reflection of Japan’s motivations, the fact that the majority of Japan’s aid goes toward
projects that advance the growth strategy outlined above demonstrates that Japan is
mainly providing aid to revitalize its economy.
This chapter contains the following sections. The first section shows that Japan
has struggled to grow economically following the bursting of its bubble economy in 1990.
It also discusses the government’s strategy of exporting infrastructure systems as a means
to promote economic growth and why the government chose this strategy. The second
section shows that Japan directs the majority of its aid to infrastructure projects in
Southeast Asia and explains how this characteristic of the aid program benefits Japan’s
economic interests. The chapter ends with an examination of and response to the
constructivist explanation for Japan’s aid-giving.
Japan’s Economy
Japan’s economic has been struggling since the bursting of Japan’s “bubble
economy” in 1990. In the 1980s, real estate and stock prices rose rapidly, creating an
asset price bubble that inevitably “popped” when prices decreased dramatically (Lim,
2014). According to Hausman and Wiedland, from 1991 to 1996, land prices decreased
by 50%, and the Nikkei, the index of Japanese stocks, fell by almost 60% from 1989 to
1992 (2014). The bursting of the asset bubble led to economic stagnation and deflation,
which have lasted for two decades (Hausman & Wiedland, 2014). Figure 1 shows that
since 1992, Japan’s annual real GDP growth has remained below the aggregate of annual
real GDP growth of advanced economies (IMF, 2019). Japan experienced a modest
recovery from 2002 to 2007, but that was soon wiped out by the 2008 financial crisis
16

(Tonami, 2018; Hausman & Wiedland, 2014). Then, in 2011, Japan was hit by a tsunami
and earthquake that killed close to 200,000 people and caused the second worst nuclear
disaster after Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 (Feldhoff, 2014; Hausman & Wiedland,
2014). As a result of these disasters, Japan’s annual real GDP growth decreased from
4.2% in 2010 to -0.1% in 2011 (Hausman & Wiedland, 2014).
Advanced economies

Japan

Figure 1: Comparison of Japanese real GDP to real GDP of advanced economies, the world, and
emerging markets (1980-2019) (IMF, 2019)

In order to bring Japan out of its decades-long state of slow growth and deflation,
the government instituted a three-pronged program called “Abenomics” in 2013. 3 The
three arrows of the program are loose monetary policy, fiscal stimulus, and structural
reforms that promote sustainable economic growth (Glosserman, 2014). The purpose of
the program is to increase both GDP growth and domestic demand and bring inflation up
to 2%. The 2% inflation rate that the program was supposed to bring has yet to
materialize, but Japan has experienced solid economic growth since 2014 (IMF, 2018a).

3

The program is named after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
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Infrastructure System Export Strategy
Another pillar of Abenomics is economic growth through infrastructure systems
exports (Okuda, 2017). The government unveiled the Infrastructure System Export
Strategy in 2013, which provides guidelines for “strengthening physical, institutional, and
human connectivity within and among regions, including Asia, Middle East, and Africa”
through infrastructure development (MOFA, 2018, p.326). It also set the target of tripling
infrastructure exports by 2020 (Reuters, 2013). The director-general of the Railway
Bureau of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism explained in a
2017 interview that Japan was focusing on exports of infrastructure systems in order to
“revitalize the Japanese economy” and meet global demand for transportation
infrastructure (Okuda, 2017). To this end, the government and private businesses have
been collaborating to increase exports of infrastructure systems.
It is risky for businesses to take on infrastructure projects because of the large
scale and long-term nature of these projects (Yoshimatsu, 2017). To encourage business
to take on these projects, the government provides recipient governments with aid loans
to finance them (Yoshimatsu, 2017; Okuda, 2015). As part of the conditions for the loans,
the Japanese government requires that recipient governments choose Japanese companies
to complete the projects (Yoshimatsu, 2017; Wallace 2018). This practice, referred to as
“tying” aid, is frowned upon by the aid-giving community, but Japan’s 2018 Diplomatic
Bluebook advocates for the use of ODA to “further promote the overseas expansion of
Japanese companies,” which presumably includes tying aid (Manning, 2016; MOFA,
2018, p. 271). By tying aid loans for infrastructure projects to Japanese companies, the
government ensures that the materials and technology needed to complete the projects are
18

coming from Japan (Yoshimatsu, 2017). The hope is that the increase in Japanese
infrastructure system exports will then contribute to Japan’s economic growth
(Yoshimatsu, 2017).
Demographic Problems and Economic Growth
The government’s focus on export-driven economic growth is informed by
predictions about the economic effects of Japan’s shrinking and aging population
(Yoshimatsu, 2017). Due to low birth rates, the population is expected to decrease by
40% in the next 40 years. This decline in population is expected to cause real GDP to
decrease by 25% (IMF, 2018b). Japan’s population is also aging. Three-in-ten people in
Japan are over the age of 65, and the ratio is expected to increase to four-in-ten over the
next 40 years (IMF, 2018a). The combination of an aging society and shrinking
population will decrease productivity, consumption, and investment (IMF, 2018a;
Yoshimatsu, 2018). The government could use fiscal stimulus to boost consumption, but
the increased need for medical services and social security for the aging population will
reduce the government funds available to carry out this stimulus (Yoshimatsu, 2017).
Because domestic consumption, domestic investment, and government expenditures are
unlikely to stimulate economic growth, the government views exporting infrastructure
systems as a viable alternative for revitalizing the economy (Yoshimatsu, 2017). The next
section will show that Japan directs the majority of its aid toward projects that advance
the government’s export-driven strategy growth strategy.

19

Aid for Infrastructure Projects in Southeast Asia
In line with the strategy of the Infrastructure Export System Strategy, Japan
devotes most of its aid to economic infrastructure projects. Certain types of infrastructure
can be categorized as both economic and social infrastructure. 4 However, economic
infrastructure is generally defined as “infrastructure that promotes economic activity,”
such as roads, ports, electricity, etc. (Fourie, 2006, p.531). Social infrastructure is defined
as “infrastructure that promotes the health, education and cultural standards of the
population – activities that have both a direct and indirect impact on the quality of life”
(Fourie, 2006, p. 531). Infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and libraries are included
in this category. Figure 2 shows the sectoral allocation of Japan’s ODA compared to
average sectoral allocation from 2005-2014 of countries that are members of the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Asplund & Söderberg, 2017). Japan devotes
more aid to economic or hard infrastructure and services (50%) than other DAC countries
(23%) (2017). Twenty-nine percent (29%) of Japan’s aid goes to social or soft
infrastructure and services compared to the 56% allocated by DAC countries (Asplund &
Söderberg, 2017). Figure 3 shows that in 2015-2016, within the category of economic
infrastructure and services, Japan allocated the majority of its $9.3 billion of net aid to
transport, storage, and energy creation and supply (OECD, 2018; OECD, 2016). In
comparison, Japan’s humanitarian aid allocation was $921 million (OECD, 2018). Based
on the data presented above, Japan’s aid program appears to be primarily geared toward
projects that are likely to require infrastructure system exports and projects that support
4

Building houses, for example, can have both social and economic effects. Therefore, housing could be
categorized as either economic or social infrastructure (Fourie, 2006).
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economic activity in recipient countries. The way in which economic infrastructure can
promote economic activity will be discussed later on in the chapter.
Another characteristic of Japan’s aid program is its focus on Southeast Asia. The
2015 Development Cooperation Charter makes specific mention of infrastructure
development in countries that are part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). The charter states that development cooperation will be extended to ASEAN
countries to promote the creation of the ASEAN Community and help with the
“development both physical and non-physical infrastructure including that which is
needed for strengthening connectivity and the reduction of disparities both within the
region and within individual countries” (MOFA, 2015). This commitment is reflected in
Japan’s regional allocations. As mentioned above, the majority of Japan’s aid goes
toward infrastructure development and, in 2016-2017, 33% of Japanese ODA went to
South and Central Asia, while 26.9% went to other Asian countries and Oceana (OECD,
2018). In terms of specific countries, data from the OECD on average gross
disbursements of bilateral aid shows that, from 2012 to 2016, Vietnam, Indonesia,
Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines were consistently among the top ten recipients of
Japanese ODA (OECD, 2018; OECD, 2017; OECD, 2016; OECD, 2014). Because the
majority of Japan’s aid goes to Southeast Asian countries and infrastructure, it follows
that Japan is mainly using aid to fund infrastructure in Southeast Asia.
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Figure 2: Average Sectoral ODA Allocation of the DAC and Japan (2005-2014) (Asplund &
Söderberg, 2017)

Figure 3: Share of Japan’s gross bilateral ODA by sector (2015-2016) (OECD, 2017)

The focus on infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia makes sense in light of
Japan’s economic relations with countries in the region. Japan not only shares a wartime
history with some Southeast Asian countries, it also has strong trade and commercial ties
with them. Japan still conducts the majority of its trade with China and the U.S., but there
has been a shift in ODA, investment, and trade relations to Southeast Asian countries
(Wallace, 2018). Nine of Japan’s 15 economic partnership agreements (EPAs) that came
into effect in 2017 were with Southeast Asian nations and, after China, Japan is
ASEAN’s second largest trading partner (Sim, 2016; Wallace, 2018). In 2015, Japan was
also the single largest national financer of foreign direct investment (FDI) to ASEAN
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(Pacheco Pardo, 2017). The majority of the investment went to infrastructure
development (Pacheco Pardo, 2017).
With regard to the top recipients of Japanese aid, Indonesia supplies Japan with
natural gas, access to shipping lanes for oil from the Middle East, and foreign direct
investment, and the two countries share community ties (Trinidad, 2007). Thailand has
been a major aid recipient because stabilizing Thailand was seen as a key factor for
maintaining stability in Southeast Asia generally. Thailand has achieved a certain level of
political and economic stability, but aid continues to flow there because of Japan’s
sizable investments in the country (Trinidad, 2007). The Philippines is a priority because
of Japanese business interests, the convergence of interests between Japanese businesses
and Filipino elites, and Japan’s desire to support U.S. policy toward the Philippines
(Trinidad, 2007).
Japan also has economic ties with Vietnam and Myanmar, albeit to a lesser degree
than with Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Japan is Vietnam’s “third largest
investor and trading partner” (Vuving & Do, 2017, p.164). Japan was Myanmar’s largest
trading partner prior to the military coup in 1988. The coup led to a decrease in the flow
of Japanese aid and investment into Myanmar (Hong, 2014). In 2010, however, the
Burmese government began loosening economic and political controls. Japan hopes to
take advantage of what it views as positive political changes to strengthen its economic
and political ties with Myanmar, and aid is part of the larger effort to engage with
Myanmar (Hong, 2014). The correlation between the top recipient countries of Japanese
aid and Japan’s major economic partners ensures that Japan reaps the benefits of the
improved infrastructure in these countries.
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The Role of Infrastructure Development in Facilitating Trade
By funding infrastructure development in economically important countries in
Southeast Asia, Japan is increasing their capacity to trade with Japan (Yamamoto, 2017).
When everything proceeds according to the government’s plans, Japan’s tied aid loans
for infrastructure can have two effects. The first effect is an increase in Japanese
infrastructure system exports to Southeast Asia. The second effect is an increase in trade
due to improved infrastructure. Wallace (2018) succinctly explains the benefits of
infrastructure development for trade:
Deploying ‘connectivity’ infrastructure helps to facilitate in a timely,
efficient and cost-effective fashion the movement of natural resources,
industrial components and other inputs, human resources, information and,
ultimately, finished goods for distribution and sale, between specialized
industrial nodes within an economic corridor.
Building roads, bridges, ports, and other forms of economic infrastructure ensures that
goods from Japan can be brought into Southeast Asian countries and manufactured goods
can be efficiently transported to Japan at a lower cost, thereby facilitating trade between
Japan and Southeast Asian countries (Pacheco Pardo, 2017).
In addition to increasing trade, infrastructure development has a political
dimension. Private actors are unlikely to invest in infrastructure projects without
government-backing, and the process of building and maintaining infrastructure can take
years or decades (Moyo, 2010; Pardo Pacheco, 2017). By supporting infrastructure
development, Japan is signaling that it is committed to having a long-term economic
relationship with Southeast Asian nations (Wallace, 2018). To summarize the two
24

preceding two sections, Japan’s aid program is primarily geared toward economic
infrastructure development in Southeast Asia. Because building infrastructure in
Southeast Asia contributes to the Japanese government’s goal of economic growth
through infrastructure exports and facilitates trade between Japan and Southeast Asian
countries, it is reasonable to assume that Japan’s aid program is strongly motivated by the
desire for economic growth. Hereafter, when the term “infrastructure” is used, it refers to
economic infrastructure.
One could argue that the overwhelming focus on infrastructure in Southeast Asia
does not prove that Japan’s aid-giving is solely motivated by the pursuit of economic
growth, because there is an acute need for economic infrastructure investment,
particularly in energy and transportation infrastructure, in developing countries (Pacheco
Pardo, 2017). China, Southeast Asia, and India constitute the majority of this demand
(Pacheco Pardo, 2017). The Asian Development Bank (ADB), 5 which provides financial
assistance for development, has a capital base of $165 billion, but the estimated need for
infrastructure investment between 2011 and 2020 is $8.2 trillion (Pacheco Pardo, 2017).
Therefore, assuming that infrastructure development actually benefits countries, Japan’s
ODA is addressing a need in Southeast Asia. This paper does not dispute that there is an
acute need for infrastructure in Southeast Asian countries. However, aid can benefit
recipients and still be primarily motivated by a desire for economic growth. Given that
the majority of Japan’s aid goes toward projects that advance its growth strategy, it is
reasonable to assume that Japan’s primary goal in giving this aid is the pursuit of
economic growth. In addition, Japan has implemented projects that benefit Japan more
5

The ADB specifically provides loans, grants, and technical assistance to countries in the Asia-Pacific
region (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2019).
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than the recipient country (Furuoka, 2005). For example, according to Arase, in the 1980s
Japan used aid to fund the Eastern Seaboard Project in Thailand. The project did not
make sense in terms of efficient resource allocation, but it did contribute to Japan’s
economic goal of moving labor intensive industries to Thailand (1995). These types of
occurrences suggest that, in some instances, Japan finances infrastructure that only serves
its interests.
Constructivist Counterargument and Response
Proponents of the constructivist explanation for Japan’s aid-giving argue that
Japan’s effort to follow the norms of the DAC of the OECD demonstrates that its aid
program is geared toward poverty-reduction (Takahashi & Jain, 2000; Kato, 2016). These
norms include the expectation that member countries will devote most of their aid to
social and administrative projects in low-income countries and distribute more grants
than loans (Lancaster, 2010). In response to criticisms from member countries of the
DAC, Japan has worked to modify its aid program to conform to these norms (Jain, 2016)
. 6 Although bilateral loans continue to make up the largest percentage of Japan’s aid,
Japan has increased its disbursement of bilateral grants, mainly in the form of technical
assistances (Owa, 2017; Arase, 2005). Japan has also allocated more aid to poor countries
like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Manning, 2016). Even Japan’s focus on infrastructure
could be interpreted as a sign of its commitment to poverty reduction because economic
growth can lift people out of poverty (Lancaster, 2007).
Whether economic growth automatically leads to poverty reduction is up for
debate. However, Japan’s focus on middle-income countries over least developed
6

Member countries of the DAC write “peer reviews” which judge the quality of each member country’s
program. Other member countries have criticized Japan’s program in these reviews (Manning, 2016).
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countries (LDCs) challenges the argument that Japan is primarily concerned with
poverty-reduction. LDCs are countries that have a three-year average gross national
income (GNI) per capital level of less than $1,025 and low levels of human capital, and
are judged to be vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks (UN, n.d.). Because
LDCs arguably have the most need, DAC countries typically direct most of their aid to
these countries (Lancaster, 2010). In 2016, the majority of Japan’s bilateral aid (45.1%)
went to low middle-income countries (OECD, 2018). LDCs received 20% of Japan’s aid,
which was slightly below the DAC country average of 21.9% (OECD, 2018). Out of the
top recipients of Japanese aid, only Myanmar is classified as an LDC (UN, 2018). If
poverty reduction through economic growth was a major objective of Japan’s aid
program, Japan would probably direct more of its aid to the most impoverished countries
(Pacheco Pardo, 2017). Instead, it directs most of its aid to infrastructure projects in
economically important countries.
Conclusion
From the 1950s through the 1980s, aid was primarily used to promote Japan’s
economic development. The “request-based” system for distributing reparations helped
establish Japanese private companies in Asian countries. These companies created
infrastructure in the recipient countries, which then lead to the development of markets
for Japanese goods (Arase, 1995). In addition to creating markets for Japanese goods, aid
also served more indirect economic functions such as enabling access to raw materials,
influencing recipient governments to implement favorable trade policies, and contributing
to the restructuring of domestic industries (Arase, 1995). Eventually, rapid growth in the
1980s diminished the need to use aid to secure export markets. However, Japan continued
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to direct the majority of its aid to infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia in order to
promote trade between Japan and countries in the region. Thus, while economic interests
are not the sole drivers of Japan’s aid program anymore, Japan’s aid-giving is still
strongly geared toward the pursuit of economic interests. The next chapter will show that
the pursuit of strategic interests has also emerged as an important driver of Japan’s aid
program.
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Chapter 3

Japan’s Strategic Interests
The neorealist view argues that donor countries base their aid provisions on both
economic and strategic interests as the main drivers of aid-giving. The last chapter
showed that Japan’s pursuit of economic growth motivates its aid-giving. This chapter
will demonstrate that Japan’s aid-giving is also motivated by the pursuit of strategic
interests. The term “strategic interests” can encompass a large range of topics from
diplomatic relations to maritime security. In this chapter, “strategic interests” refer
generally to non-economic issues related to the well-being of Japan.
This chapter shows that the pursuit of strategic interests has become a major driver of
Japan’s aid policy. The concept of aid as a strategic tool has its origins in the
“comprehensive security plan” Japan created after a series of events shocked Japan
economically and politically in the 1970s (Yamamoto, 2017). As a result of these shocks,
beginning in the 1970s, Japan used aid not only for economic interests, such as to access
raw materials and expand trade, but also for strategic interests, such as to secure energy
resources and strengthen diplomatic ties. Eventually, the advancement of Japan’s
strategic interests became an official part of Japan’s aid program beginning in 2003.
Revisions to Japan’s aid charter and key legislative changes that enabled the
implementation of the new strategic direction of aid outlined in the charter show that the
pursuit of strategic interests is a major aid objective. In particular, the government revised
the aid charter in 2003, placing a greater emphasis on using aid to advance Japan’s peace
and security. This new language remained in the charter when it was revised again in
2015. Further, in connection with the 2003 revision, Japan established a new aid scheme
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in 2006 and enacted legislative changes that allowed aid to be given to foreign militaries.
Over the years, Japan has followed through on this new direction through the provision of
aid-funded military vessels and coastguard training to Southeast Asian nations. Taken
together, these changes show that aid is viewed by the government as a strategic tool.
The chapter begins with a brief history of the shift in Japan’s program from a purely
economic focus to a strategic and economic focus. The second section explains why the
pursuit of strategic interests has joined the pursuit of economic interests as a goal for
Japan’s aid program, even though it may not be as deeply rooted as the pursuit of
economic interests. The third section argues that the shift toward an aid program driven
by strategic goals is rooted in Japan’s security concerns vis-à-vis China. The fourth
section illustrates the fact that Japan has a limited number of strategic tools to address
certain security threats posed by China. The final section then lists the policy and
legislative changes that have established the pursuit of Japan’s strategic interests as a key
aid objective. The section also provides examples of the ways in which Japan uses aid as
a strategic tool.
History of Aid as a Strategic Tool
From 1954 into the 1980s, Japan’s aid program was primarily geared toward
pursuing economic interests. However, in the 1970s, the motivations underlying Japan’s
aid program expanded to include the pursuit of diplomatic goals and resource security
(Lancaster, 2007). This shift occurred due to pressure from the U.S. and a series of
economic and political shocks during the 1970s related to oil, food, and diplomacy
(Yamamoto, 2017).
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One shift in the use of Japan’s aid occurred in the area of alliance maintenance. In
1960, Japan was admitted to the Donor Aid Committee (DAC) of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 1 At this time, Japan’s aid provisions
were relatively small – averaging around 0.25% of its gross national product (GNP) while
the average of all DAC members was 0.50% of GNP (Lancaster, 2007). However,
pressure from the U.S. to share in the burden of securing Asia in the 1970s motivated
Japan to increase its aid allocations (Lancaster, 2007). Japan could not offer military
support to the U.S. because of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which forbids Japan
from having a military, but Tokyo hoped that aid would supplement U.S. efforts in the
region. To this end, Japan increased its aid from $246 million in 1960 to $5.8 billion in
1973 (Kim & Potter, 2012). This experience expanded the focus of Japan’s aid program
to alliance maintenance.
In addition to pressure from the U.S., a series of economic and political shocks
during the 1970s caused Japan to shift the focus of its aid program from purely economic
goals to diplomacy and security goals (Lancaster, 2007). The first two shocks were an oil
shock, when the Organization of Oil Producing Economies (OPEC) instituted an oil
embargo in 1973, and a food shock, also in 1973, when President Nixon placed an
embargo on U.S. soybeans going to Japan. The oil shock raised the price of oil and
showed that unrest in other regions could negatively affect Japan’s access to energy and
trade and thus threaten Japan’s security (Yamamoto, 2017). Consequently, Japan sent a
mission with a large aid package to OPEC countries and later to China (for oil) to
strengthen diplomatic ties (Arase, 1995; Asplund and Söderberg, 2017). Accordingly, aid
1

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD is a global aid organization comprised of
29 member countries, the majority of which are Western industrialized countries (Jain, 2016).
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was added to Japan’s “comprehensive security” strategy, which placed a “greater
emphasis on economic and diplomatic means than on military means for pursuing the
nation’s security” (Yamamoto, 2017; Akaha, 1991, p.324). Turning to the soybean shock,
the shortage of soybeans created by President Nixon’s embargo, as well as potential
future food insecurity, motivated Japan to extend aid beyond its traditional recipients in
Asia to countries like Brazil (Lancaster, 2007). 2 These two shocks drove Japan to place a
greater importance on natural resource and food security as a foreign policy goal and to
use aid to pursue this type of security (Kato, 2016; Lancaster, 2007).
Another shock that influenced Japan’s aid program related to diplomacy. This
shock occurred when Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visit to Southeast Asia was met
with protests in Thailand and Indonesia (Kato, 2016). The protests were a reaction to the
perceived oversaturation of Japanese firms in these countries (Kato, 2016). They were
also a manifestation of the anger citizens in these countries felt towards the idea that
Japan was only engaging with Southeast Asian countries in order to promote its
commercial interests (Lancaster, 2007). One of the effects of these protests was that they
led Japan to rethink the practice of using aid to support the expansion of Japanese
businesses in the region and its policy toward Southeast Asia in general (Lancaster, 2007).
Consequently, the government created the Fukuda Doctrine, named after Prime Minister
Fukuda Takeo (Kato, 2016). The doctrine expressed Japan’s disavowal of becoming a
military power, its commitment to helping foster peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia
through development assistance to countries in the region, and its desire for a positive

2

There was a possibility of expanding the production of soybeans in Brazil and exporting them, along with
other agricultural goods, to Japan (Lancaster, 2007).
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relationship with Southeast Asian nations based on “mutual trust and understanding”
(Pressello, 2018).
Outreach to Southeast Asia continued under Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro
and Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō (Peng Er, 2001). For example, Prime Minister
Hashimoto suggested holding Japan-ASEAN 3 political summits and bilateral security
talks (Peng Er, 2001). Then, when South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia were suffering
from the effects of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, Prime Minister Obuchi provided
a major aid package of $42 billion (Peng Er, 2001). Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has
continued this policy of engagement. During his first year in office in 2006, he visited all
10 ASEAN countries (Sim, 2016). In 2013, he marked the 40-year anniversary of JapanASEAN relations by pledging to give $26.6 billion worth of aid loans over five years
(Sim, 2016). Then, in 2016, he pledged to disburse about $7 billion worth of aid to
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam over three years (Sim, 2016).
The final shock, also related to diplomacy, was President Nixon’s decision to visit
China in 1972 and thus end China’s diplomatic isolation (Lancaster, 2007). Japan was not
given advance notice of this visit, but it quickly also established diplomatic ties with
China after the visit and began providing aid in 1979 (Lancaster, 2007; “After 40 Years,”
2018). The aid program to China eventually became Japan’s largest program (Lancaster,
2007). This program funded economic infrastructure projects, poverty reduction, and
human resource training in China for 40 years before ending in 2018 (“After 40 Years,”
2018). Japan viewed this aid through both an economic and a political lens. On the

3

ASEAN stands for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN was formed in 1967 and its
current members are the Philippines, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei
Darussalam, Indonesia, and Thailand (U.S. Department of State, 2019).
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economic side, aid-funded infrastructure projects would help make trade easier between
the two countries. On the political side, Japan’s help would create a better relationship
between the countries and lead to a Chinese foreign policy that was compatible with the
existing global order (Suzuki & Wallace, 2017). As a whole, the shocks described above
forced Japan to place a greater importance on aid as a tool for promoting Japan’s
diplomatic and security goals (Yamamoto, 2017).
Centering of Strategic Interests
Although Japan views aid as a strategic tool, its use in this context is not as deeply
rooted as its use as an economic tool. This circumstance is due to the origins of the aid
program and the general nature of Japan’s post-WWII focus on economic growth. From
the outset of the aid program, aid policy was controlled by the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) 4 and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which were concerned
with business interests. As a result, aid was primarily used as a tool to advance Japan’s
economic development (Yamamoto, 2017). In addition, some researchers argue there has
been a cultural taboo on public debates about military issues (Yuri, 2003). The taboo is
exemplified by the fact that, up until the early 1990s, Japan was one of the few developed
countries where there was a dearth of security-related courses in universities (Yuri, 2003).
The shift in the aid program toward strategic pursuits is a more recent
phenomenon. It was only in the 1990s that the country began pursuing a more active
foreign policy. Yamamoto provides a concise overview of the evolution of the
government’s view of foreign policy. He argues that up until the 1990s, the Heisei
Kenkyūkai faction in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was the dominant
4

The MITI was reorganized to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 2001 (METI, n.d.).
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faction. The faction was more concerned with economic growth and supported the
Yoshida Doctrine, which committed Japan to a strategy of using economic means to
achieve political power and leaving issues of security to the U.S. (Arase, 1995;
Yamamoto, 2017). The Yoshida Doctrine extended to Japan’s use of aid (Yamamoto,
2017). However, the loss of power of the Heisei Kenkyūkai faction due to electoral
system reform created more space in the government for political figures who wanted to
focus on developing Japan’s foreign policy (Yamamoto, 2017). Consequently, political
activity surrounding foreign policy increased (Yamamoto, 2017). As a result of the
increase in political activity surrounding foreign policy, aid policy started to be used as a
political tool. For example, Japan suspended grant aid to China in 1994 in response to
China’s nuclear weapons tests (Takamine, 2006). 5
The emphasis on foreign policy was then deepened and expanded by the Seiwa
Seisaku Kenkyūkai (seiwakai) faction of the LDP, which rose to power in 2001. The
seiwakai faction was committed to moving away from the Yoshida Doctrine and
instituting new diplomatic and security policies (Yamamoto, 2017). Under Prime
Minister Abe, the government has continued to prioritize diplomatic and security issues
through his proactive national strategy. The strategy has led to measures such as
overturning the ban on arms exports introduced in 1976 and re-interpreting the
constitution’s “peace clause” to expand the definition of self-defense (Furuoka, 2016).

5

While the aid sanctions were not uniformly implemented for strategic reasons, the decision to sanction
China was most likely a result of changing perceptions of China’s military modernization (Takamine,
2006). In the early 2000s, mainstream Japanese policymakers and specialists did not see China’s military
capabilities as an immediate threat. Nevertheless, the possibility of China becoming a threat in the future
and the belief that Japan was indirectly advancing China’s militarization through aid provisions convinced
policymakers that Japan needed to use its aid to discourage “disruptive” Chinese military behavior
(Takamine, 2006, p. 445).
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With regard to aid specifically, Prime Minister Abe has sought to expand the role of aid
in security beyond “comprehensive security” (Yamamoto, 2017). One product of this
effort is the argument for using aid as a strategic tool that is included in the 2013 National
Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS states that in order to facilitate the “strategic
utilization of ODA,” Japan will develop a system that “enables assistance to potential
recipient organizations that cannot receive Japan’s assistance under the current schemes”
(Kantei, 2013). The inclusion of aid as part of Japan’s national security strategy shows
that the government views aid as a strategic tool, joining the long-standing view of aid as
an economic tool.
Japan’s Security Environment
The shift toward an aid program driven by strategic goals is also a reflection of
Japan’s security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region. Among Tokyo’s chief security
concerns are North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, an increasingly assertive China,
and the security of energy and resource imports. These concerns are exacerbated by both
the U.S’s seeming disinterest in its security commitments in Asia and China’s efforts to
impose costs on U.S. intervention in the region (Suzuki & Wallace, 2018).
China, in particular, is seen as a threat to Japan’s resource and general maritime
security. In 2009, China distributed a note to all UN members declaring the country’s
sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea (Yamamoto, 2017). The note and change
in slogans have been accompanied by increased Chinese activity in the South China Sea
and East China Sea. Specifically, China seized Mischief Reef and the Scarborough Shoal
from the Philippines, which are located in the South China Sea (Horowitz, 2015). Also, in
2014, it began constructing islands in a disputed area of the South China Sea (it has
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completed seven of these islands). China then ignored the Hague’s 2016 ruling that
denied its claims of ownership of territories in the South China Sea (Pei, 2018). In the
East China Sea, China has increased naval activity near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands (Lubin, 2019). China has also established an air defense identification zone
(ADIZ) over the East China Sea that overlaps with Japan and South Korea’s respective
ADIZs (Pei, 2018). Japan views these numerous actions as part of China’s strategy to
enforce its territorial claims (Yamamoto, 2017).
Further, Japan fears that China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea will
threaten the sea lines of communication (SLOC) – trade routes used to bring goods to
Japan – located in these waters (Bowers & Grønning, 2017; Yamamoto, 2017). Seventy
percent (70%) of Japan’s oil travels close to the territories China wishes to claim (Peng
Er, 2001). Therefore, China’s potential enforcement of claims to territories in the South
China Sea could place Japan’s trade routes under China’s control (Bowers & Grønning,
2017).
Japan’s Other Strategic Tools
Japan has a limited number of strategic tools, in addition to aid, to address
China’s actions in the South China Sea, which means that Japan must use all of the
resources at its disposal to advance its security in this region. Japan is unique in that it
cannot take advantage of the tools that countries traditionally use to preserve their
security. When Japan was defeated and occupied in World War II, the U.S. occupation
force prioritized demilitarization and democratization. This translated into the creation of
a new constitution that removed Japan’s ability to wage war and maintain a military
(Masaru, 2009). Article 9 of the constitution states:
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Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized (Chapter II, Article 9).
While Japan’s military powers were forfeited by Article 9, Japanese leaders interpreted
the article as permitting Japan to exercise its right to self-defense (Bowers & Grønning,
2017). Based on this interpretation, Japan instituted an “exclusively defense-orientated
policy” (Suzuki & Wallace, 2018). Japan would only attack if it was attacked first, and
Japan’s attack would be limited to repelling the threat (Suzuki & Wallace, 2018). The
Self-Defense Force (SDF) was created in order to carry out this defense, but its abilities
are limited. The SDF cannot engage in offensive operations or support other countries’
military activities (Bowers & Grønning, 2017). Although Japan is unable to project force
abroad, successive security laws have led to incremental shifts in Japan’s defense
capabilities (Bowers & Grønning, 2017). For example, Japan’s security laws were
amended in 2015 to allow a limited right to collective self-defense (Yamamoto, 2017). In
addition to the SDF, Japan relies on U.S.-enforced maritime security, international norms,
and the law of the sea to secure itself (Bowers & Grønning, 2017). The U.S. remains the
main source of Japan’s security, and the two countries share concerns about China’s
actions (Bowers & Grønning, 2017).These concerns are reflected in the revised bilateral
Guidelines for Defensive Cooperation, which affirms their commitment to meeting
challenges posed by states, i.e. China, that try to violate sovereignty and challenge the
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status quo (Hornung & Reeves, 2017). While Japan and the U.S.’s interests are aligned,
with China imposing costs on U.S. action in the Asia-Pacific region (Pei, 2018) and U.S.
forces dispersed in other regions (Bowers & Grønning, 2017), Japan must use all
available tools to secure itself, including aid. The next section will show that the pursuit
of strategic interests has become a key part of Japan’s aid program through changes in the
aid charter and legislative changes.
Aid Charter Changes and Legislative Changes
The emphasis placed on the use of aid to pursue Japan’s national interests in the
2003 ODA Charter, the use of quasi-military aid, and further emphasis on the use of aid
in this context in the 2015 Development Charter demonstrate that advancing strategic
interests has become an important part of Japan’s aid program. The aid charter is the
foundation of Japan’s aid program, as it outlines the “philosophy, basic policies, and
priorities” of Japan’s aid program (MOFA, 2015; Okaniwa, 2015). Therefore, changes in
the charter signal changes in the direction of the program. As revised, the 2003 charter
states that the “objectives of Japan’s ODA are to contribute to the peace and development
of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own security and
prosperity” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA], 2003). The revised charter’s explicit
commitment to using aid to advance Japan’s security and prosperity is a departure from
Japan’s previous approach to aid. As outlined above, in line with the Yoshida Doctrine,
aid was used to support Japan’s economic development through infrastructure
development in recipient countries (Arase, 1995; Yamamoto, 2017). The economic
advancement of other countries facilitated trade and gave Japan access to raw materials
(Arase, 1995). This approach was reflected in the lack of mention of national interest or
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security in the 1992 ODA Charter (Jain, 2014). Japan also avoided placing any political
conditions on its aid, in order to have economic relations with as wide of a range of
countries as possible (Yamamoto, 2017). The 2003 revision represents a shift in the
nature of Japan’s aid program from a purely economic focus to an economic and strategic
focus (Yamamoto, 2017). As described further below, the MOFA revised the aid charter
again in 2015, but the 2015 revised charter still emphasizes the strategic purpose of aid.
The commitment to using aid as a strategic tool expressed in the 2003 version of
the aid charter is reflected in Japan’s use of aid to support militaries of Southeast Asian
nations. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was an increase in piracy involving
Japanese ships in the South China Sea. The number of cases rose from 8 in 1995 to 31 in
2000 (MOFA, 2001). In order to address this issue, Japan created the new aid scheme of
“Grant Aid for Cooperation on Counterterrorism and Security Enhancement” in 2006,
which involved providing aid-funded equipment and training to improve maritime law
enforcement capabilities (Yamamoto, 2017). A year after establishing this program,
Japan gave three patrol boats to Indonesia to combat piracy in the Strait of Malacca. This
provision was the first time Japan had used aid to provide military vessels (Yamamoto,
2017). Then, in 2014, the government lifted the ban on exporting military equipment
(Yamamoto, 2017). Building off of this change, the government also allowed aid to be
used to advance Japan’s interests and contribute to international peace (Bowers &
Grønning, 2017). Then, the government lifted the restriction on the provision of aid to
foreign militaries (Bowers & Grønning, 2017). The provisions are allowed as long as
they promote peace contributions, international cooperation, or Japan’s security
(Hornung & Reeves, 2017). Prime Minister Abe defended these legislative changes
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arguing that they enabled Japan to support ASEAN countries in their efforts to
“safeguard the seas” and ensure freedom of navigation (Abe, 2014). Subsequently, Japan
provided the Philippines with an aid loan for the purchase of 10 patrol vessels in 2013
and promised to provide 2 new vessels in 2016 (Sim, 2016; Yamamoto 2017). It also
promised to provide 6 refurbished vessels to Vietnam in 2014 (Yamamoto, 2017). In
addition to military equipment, Japan has given aid to increase the capacity of
coastguards in Southeast Asian countries.
Japan’s more recent contributions to Southeast Asian militaries are part of
Tokyo’s efforts to influence disputes in the South China Sea and secure its trade routes
(Bowers & Grønning, 2017). A number of countries have territorial disputes with China.
For example, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and China all claim
ownership over the Paracel and Spratly Islands (Castro De Cruz, 2017). At least one
nation, Vietnam, has engaged in naval skirmishes over the Spratlys with China. Japan has
directed the majority of its quasi-military aid and coastguard training to the Southeast
Asian countries engaged in disputes, especially the Philippines and Vietnam (Bowers &
Grønning, 2017; Yamamoto, 2017). The Japanese government contends that coastguard
training is non-military assistance because the coastguard helps with law enforcement
(Yamamoto, 2017). Nevertheless, increasing coastguard capacity enables Southeast
Asian countries to devote more resources to monitoring and countering the activities of
Chinese militias (Yamamoto, 2017). China uses these “maritime militia” to secure its
maritime and territorial claims, some of which encompass Japan’s trade routes (Erickson
& Johnson, 2015). Thus, by increasing the capacity of Southeast Asian countries to
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counter these activities, Japan is indirectly securing its trade routes and thus using aid as a
strategic tool.
The 2015 Development Charter reaffirms the emphasis on the use of aid as a
means to advance Japan’s national interests. Like the 2003 charter, the first paragraph of
the 2015 charter states that Japan’s national interests are intertwined with the condition of
the international community. Therefore, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace,” Japan
must work with other countries to tackle global challenges (MOFA, 2015, p.2). The
document also states that development cooperation, i.e., aid-giving, advances Japan’s
national interests, which include maintaining the “peace and security” of Japan,
increasing prosperity, preserving stability, and maintaining an international order rooted
in universal values (MOFA, 2015). Both the 2003 and the 2015 charters establish a link
between Japan’s national interests and aid provision. Japan’s aid is supposed to help
developing countries with economic development and humanitarian issues, but the
ultimate goal is the advancement of Japan’s strategic interests, i.e., “security and
prosperity.”
Conclusion
The use of aid to promote domestic economic growth has been a long-standing
feature of Japan’s aid. Under the Yoshida Doctrine, the focus of aid was non-military
projects like infrastructure development and educational programs (Hornung & Reeves,
2017). However, through revisions to the aid charter, the pursuit of strategic goals
became a key focus of Japan’s aid program. The new direction for aid outlined in the
charter was then reinforced by legislative changes that allowed Japan to use aid to
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contribute to maritime security and other strategic initiatives. Consequently, Japan directs
aid to security-related projects like capacity-building for the Vietnamese coast guard.
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Chapter 4

Japan and Human Rights Issues in Recipient Countries
The previous chapters showed that the neorealist view of aid-giving provides the
best explanation for why Japan gives aid. Japan provides aid loans for infrastructure in
Southeast Asia as a means to promote exports and, by extension, economic growth. In
addition to pursuing economic growth, Japan’s aid program is driven by the pursuit of
strategic goals like securing Japan’s maritime environment. This explanation for Japan’s
behavior as an aid donor can also be used to explain Japan’s record of using aid to
address human rights issues in recipient countries.
This chapter argues that because Japan’s aid decisions vis-à-vis human rights
violations are also driven by economic and strategic considerations, Japan tends not to
impose aid sanctions on strategically and economically important countries. When it does
sanction these countries, it usually does so because of domestic and/or international
pressure. Also, it will remove the sanctions as soon as possible, even when there have
been no substantive improvements in human rights conditions. These actions indicate that
when Japan is given the option of either responding to human rights violations or
protecting its interests, like most countries, it will choose to protect its interests. This
chapter does not argue that economic and strategic interests are the only factors that
motivate Japan’s actions vis-à-vis human rights. Factors such as historical relationships
and culture can also influence Japan’s actions. Rather, the chapter demonstrates that
Japan’s economic and strategic interests significantly influence its behavior vis-à-vis
human rights.
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The chapter is organized as follows. The first section explains how aid can be
used as a political tool. The second section discusses Japan’s commitment to human
rights in general. The third section provides an overview of human rights conditions in
Japan’s top recipient countries. Then, the fourth section shows that Japan applies
sanctions selectively in accordance with its economic and strategic interests. The fifth
section provides alternative explanations for Japan’s behavior. Finally, the chapter ends
with a discussion of the implications of the neorealist explanation for the future of
Japan’s human rights diplomacy. While the question of whether aid is an effective
political tool is a necessary discussion, it will not be addressed in this paper.
Aid as a Political Tool
Before discussing Japan’s actions vis-à-vis human rights violations, it is necessary
to understand how aid can be used as a political tool. As a major aid donor, Japan has
leverage or bargaining power over recipient countries (Maswood, 2001). Bargaining
power can be defined as “the degree to which an actor is able to inﬂuence the
expectations of its opponent in a way that is beneﬁcial to the interests of that actor”
(Slantchev, 2005, p.4). Japan has bargaining power over recipient countries that rely
heavily on its foreign aid. Japan could exercise its bargaining power over recipient
countries by threatening to reduce or withdraw aid in response to human rights abuses. In
an ideal scenario, if Japan’s threat is credible, then the recipient countries will stop the
human rights abuses out of fear of losing aid.
Although Japan theoretically has the power to induce policy changes in other
countries, how Japan actually leverages its power is far more complex than the previous
hypothetical situation suggests. Nevertheless, the main point is that aid sanctions can be
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used as a political tool. A common tactic is the imposition of “negative aid sanctions,”
which involves diminishing or taking away aid when a recipient country enacts policies
the donor does not like. Donors can also adopt “positive linkage,” which entails
increasing aid when a recipient country makes desirable changes in the eyes of the donor
(Furuoka, 2005). While aid sanctions are not the only way to respond to human rights
violations in recipient countries, it is a tactic that Japan has used in the past. Considering
that aid is one of Japan’s major foreign policy tools and it can ideally be leveraged to
affect human rights conditions, it is valuable to examine how Japan wields this tool
(Watanabe, 2001).
Japan’s Commitment to Human Rights
A plausible explanation for why Japan does not cut aid from countries with
human rights violations is that Japan does not care about human rights. However, robust
human rights protections in Japan; Tokyo’s adoption of human rights documents; and the
content of the Japan’s 2015 Development Charter indicate that Japan does care about
human rights. Freedom House ranks Japan as “free,” meaning political rights and civil
liberties are generally well protected (Freedom House, 2018b). In addition, individual
rights are guaranteed in the constitution; Japan is a member of the Commission on
Human Rights; and it ratified the International Covenant on Social, Economic and
Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1979. It
also joined the Commission for Human Rights in 1982 (Watanabe, 2001). Japan’s
Development Charter also mentions human rights, stating that “Japan will give priority to
assisting developing countries that make active efforts to pursue peace, democratization,
and the protection of human rights”(MOFA, 2015, p.2). Like any industrialized country,
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Japan still has room for improvement, particularly when it comes to LGBTQ rights,
gender rights, treatment of immigrants, and treatment of disabled people. It also lacks a
national human rights institution (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2019). However, overall,
Japan has a strong record of promoting and protecting human rights, at least domestically
(Watanabe, 2001).
Human Rights Conditions in Recipients of Japanese Aid
Despite Japan’s commitment to human rights, Freedom House ratings indicate
that Japan’s aid program favors countries with mild to serious human rights issues.
Vietnam, Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines have been top recipients of
Japanese ODA for a number of years (OECD, 2018; OECD, 2017; OECD, 2016; OECD,
2014). When evaluating rights conditions in these countries, Freedom House uses a oneto-seven scale to rate the level of political rights and civil liberties in the country. Higher
numbers represent worse political and civil conditions (Furuoka, 2005). 1 For example,
Vietnam and Thailand have high scores for political rights because there are “few or no
political rights because of severe government oppression, sometimes in combination with
civil war” in these countries (Freedom House, 2018a). The Philippines and Indonesia
have fairly robust protections for political rights and civil liberties. Myanmar falls
between the two groups. Indonesia is the only country with a good score for political
rights. Freedom House also provides a rating called the “Freedom Rating” based on the

1

Freedom House’s political rights and civil liberties indices do not explicitly measure human rights
conditions in each country. Some researchers separate political rights and civil liberties from discussions of
human rights, while others argue that protection of the economic, social, cultural rights that are
encompassed in the phrase human rights is a prerequisite for political freedom (Maswood, 2001). Japan has
adopted a comprehensive view of human rights. It views economic, political, civil, and social rights as
being intertwined (Maswood, 2001). Therefore, in a chapter about Japan’s approach to human rights issues,
it is reasonable to use political freedom and civil liberties as proxies for human rights conditions.
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average of the political rights and civil liberties scores (Freedom House, 2018a). Freedom
House classifies Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines as “not free.” It considers
Myanmar and Indonesia to be “partially free” (Freedom House, 2019). These ratings
indicate that although Japan is committed to human rights principles generally, it is
willing to support countries with average to extremely poor human rights environments.
How Japan Uses Aid to Respond to Human Rights Abuses
When Japan feels compelled to respond to human rights issues in recipient
countries, it prefers to use “positive linkage.” As mentioned above, there are different
ways to leverage aid to induce political changes. One method involves taking away aid in
order to punish countries (negative sanctions). The other method, positive linkage,
involves rewarding countries for positive improvements, thereby “linking” aid to good
behavior. The Japanese government admitted that it prefers positive linkage for several
reasons (Nikitina & Furuoka, 2008). According to the government, positive linkage is a
more “practical and effective” method of inducing change than negative sanctions
(Nikitina & Furuoka, 2008). In addition, negative sanctions can backfire, and they can
create the impression that Japan is trying to impose its values on other countries (Furuoka,
2006). Another reason given is that undesirable and desirable conditions can exist in the
same country and undesirable actions may be a product of a country’s domestic security
needs. Therefore, it is not Japan’s place to only pay attention to negative actions and
immediately suspend aid (Nikitina & Furuoka, 2008).
A criticism of the positive linkage approach is that continuing to provide the same
reward, in this case aid, for positive behavior may reduce the incentive to improve
policies. As aid continues to flow in, recipients become less appreciative and the appeal
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of instituting good policies decreases. Once this occurs, the donor loses leverage over the
recipient (Furuoka, 2006). Japan’s approach may seem effective in the short run, but it
could ultimately be diminishing its bargaining power. The effectiveness of positive
linkage aside, Japan’s affinity for positive linkage has not stopped it from using negative
sanctions.
Neorealist Explanation for Japan’s Actions
Japan’s track record for sanctions shows that Japan tends to apply positive linkage
across all regions, but disproportionately imposes negative sanctions on countries that are
not strategically or economically important to Japan (Furuoka, 2005). In order to prove
this assertion, it is necessary to examine Japan’s history of using positive linkage and aid
sanctions. From 1986 to 2002, Japan used positive linkage in 13 cases: the Philippines
(1986); Nicaragua (1991); El Salvador (1991); Madagascar (1991); Peru (1992); Zambia
(1992); Guinea (1992); Mongolia (1992); Cambodia (1992); Central Asian countries in
USSR (1992); Vietnam (1993); Myanmar (1995); and South Africa (1997) (Furuoka,
2005). When the military junta in Myanmar released then political prisoner Aung San
Suu Kyi, for example, Japan sent bilateral grants to rebuild a nursing school. The grants
were a reward for Suu Kyi’s release and meant to encourage further desirable changes
(Furuoka, 2006). In 12 other instances, however, from 1986 to 2002, Japan cut or reduced
aid to recipient countries in response to human rights issues in recipient countries. Tokyo
has sanctioned Myanmar (1988), China (1989), Kenya (1991), Zaire (1991), Malawi
(1992), Sudan (1992), Sierra Leon (1992), Guatemala (1993), Togo (1993), Zambia
(1993), Niger (1996), and Cote d’Ivoire (2000) (Furuoka, 2006; Furuoka, 2005). In more
recent years, Japan has imposed aid sanctions on Myanmar (2003) (in response to Aung
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San Suu Kyi being arrested for a third time); Guinea (2008) (because of a coup d’état);
and Madagascar (2009) (after a military- supported government was established)
(Shimomura, 2016).
Japan was expected to impose sanctions on Indonesia (1991), Thailand (1991),
Peru (1991), and Cambodia (1997). Not only were there significant human rights
violations occurring in these countries, but Japan had just instituted a new aid charter that
committed the country to directing its aid to countries that respected human rights
(Furuoka, 2006; Nikitina & Furuoka, 2008). In the case of Cambodia, Japan helped
improve the political situation without resorting to aid sanctions (Nikitina & Furuoka,
2008). However, imposing sanctions against Indonesia, Thailand, and Peru would have
been consistent with the new mandate of the charter (Furuoka, 2005).
Japan’s selective use of sanctions makes sense when viewed through the lens of
economic and strategic interests. With the exception of Peru, Japan had few economic
and political ties with Latin American countries in the 1990s and early 2000s (Katada,
2001; Furuoka, 2006). Guatemala and Haiti were not major trade or strategic allies while
Peru was seen as a “pro-Japan” nation (Furuoka, 2006). Japan also had weak ties with the
African nations it sanctioned compared to Asian countries. For example, in 1990, Japan
exported $197 million worth of goods to Kenya (one of the countries it sanctioned) and
imported crude materials equal to $4 million (Okuizumi, 1995). In the abstract, these
figures suggest that Japan conducted a large amount of trade with Kenya. However,
Japan did not trade much with Kenya compared to its trade with Indonesia. In 1990,
Japan’s exports to Indonesia, for example, totaled $5,052 million, and it imported $979
million worth of crude materials from Indonesia (Okuizumi, 1995). These trade figures
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show that, unlike Kenya, Indonesia was a major trading partner and source of raw
materials for Japan in the 1990s. The examples of Kenya and Indonesia are a reflection of
the general difference in importance of Asian and African nations to Japan.
An alternative explanation for Japan’s actions is that Japan was applying
sanctions to countries with poor human rights records and the majority of those countries
happened to be in Africa. However, Freedom House data shows that, at least with respect
to Asian countries, there were Asian countries with poor human rights conditions that
Japan could have sanctioned. In 1991, Indonesia and Cambodia both had an unfavorable
Freedom House score of six, and Vietnam had an even more unfavorable score of seven
(Furuoka, 2005). Similarly, in 1991, Kenya and Zaire had a score of six, and Sierra Leone
had a score of seven in 1993. 2 Japan did not impose sanctions on Indonesia or Cambodia,
and it employed positive linkages for Vietnam (Furuoka, 2005). In contrast, it promptly
suspended aid to Kenya, Zaire, and Sierra Leone (Furuoka, 2005). Despite the similarity
between human rights conditions in Asian and African countries, Japan chose to
primarily impose negative sanctions on African countries. Therefore, Japan’s willingness
to sanction African nations probably had more to do with Japan’s lack of relationship
with these countries than the concentration of human rights issues in Africa.
Given Japan’s strong ties with the Asian countries it did not sanction, it is
reasonable to assume that the desire to maintain ties with these countries contributed to
Japan’s reluctance to impose sanctions. Aid sanctions could have negatively affected
Japan’s relationship with important countries. When states impose sanctions on a
recipient, it sends a signal that the sanctioning state is unhappy with the recipient’s
2

As mentioned previously, Freedom House uses a one-to-seven scale with higher numbers representing
worse human rights conditions (Furuoka, 2005).
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behavior and it wants the behavior to change. The recipient country may object to having
another state interfering in domestic issues and, as a result, the countries may become less
friendly towards each other. This weakening of relations could then lead to a breakdown
in trade agreements or military partnerships. The desire to avoid these scenarios most
likely influenced Japan’s decision not to impose sanctions on important countries. In
addition, aid can be used to gain influence in a country (Nielsen, 2013). Therefore, Japan
may not have withdrawn aid in order to preserve its influence in recipient countries.
Japan’s tendency to cave to pressure to impose sanctions, but then remove
sanctions to important countries, even when there have been no improvements in human
rights conditions, further demonstrates that Japan is more committed to preserving its
relations with these countries than improving human rights (Furuoka, 2005). Japan had
strong political and economic ties with China and Myanmar in the 1980s. Relations with
China were a major priority for Japan. Not only is China geographically close to Japan,
the two countries had historical ties and China was providing Japan with raw materials
(Katada, 2001; Okuizumi, 1995). Japan cut aid to China in 1989 following the
government crackdown on protests in Tiananmen Square. Japan then resumed aid in 1991
(Furuoka, 2005). At the time of the sanctions, Japan was China’s largest aid donor
(Watanabe, 2001; Katada, 2001). With regard to Myanmar, Japan cut aid in 1988
following a military coup. Prior to the military coup, Japan and Myanmar enjoyed a close
political and economic relationship. There were strong ties between political elites
stretching back to before WWII, and Japan considered Myanmar to be a solidly “proJapan” state (Watanabe, 2001; Furuoka, 2006). Japan was also providing 60-70% of
Myanmar’s aid in the late 1980s (Hong, 2014). Despite these ties, in 1988, Japan cut aid
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to Myanmar in concert with other donors when the Burmese military seized power and
committed human rights violations (Furuoka, 2006). However, the following year, Japan
established relations with the new government, the State Law and Order Council
(SLORC), and partially resumed grant aid in 1995 and yen loans in 1998 (Watanabe,
2001; Furuoka, 2005).
In both cases, Japan resumed aid even though there appeared to be no
improvements in human rights conditions (Furuoka, 2005). Japan suspended aid to
Myanmar in 1988 when Myanmar had an unfavorable Freedom House score of seven.
Myanmar still had the same score when aid was partially resumed in 1995 (Furuoka,
2005). Similarly, when Japan suspended its aid to China in 1989, China’s Freedom House
score was a seven. China still had a score of seven when Japan resumed its aid in 1991.
To be fair, the resumption of aid to China may have been tacitly accepted and followed
by other countries, so Japan is not alone in its inconsistent policies (Sato & Asano, 2008).
In any event, Japan’s willingness to resume aid, even though human rights conditions had
not improved, suggests that the economic and strategic benefits of maintaining good
relations outweighed Japan’s opposition to human rights abuses.
Japan’s decision to impose sanctions on China and Myanmar despite its close ties
could indicate that Japan is willing to put human rights considerations above its strategic
and economic interests. However, Japan’s behavior before and after it imposed the
sanctions suggests that Japan was mainly responding to international pressure, rather than
internal convictions. Although the coup in Myanmar and subsequent human rights
violations were not widely publicized, Japan faced pressure from the U.S. to take a
hardline stance on the military government (Hong, 2014). The Japanese Ministry of
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Foreign Affairs (MOFA) promoted a harsher policy that aligned with the U.S. (Hong,
2014). Because MOFA represents Japan on the international stage, it is targeted by
countries seeking to put pressure on Japan (Yamamoto, 2017). Its advocacy for an
approach that aligned with U.S. interests indicates that at least a portion of the
government was susceptible to outside pressure. In contrast, Japan’s economic ministries
advocated for a softer policy because of Myanmar’s potential as a source of trade and
investment (Hong, 2014). Ultimately, Japan adopted a measured stance. It suspended aid
to Myanmar, but it maintained contact with the government. It also did not impose
economic sanctions on Myanmar, and it allowed Japanese companies to continue to
engage in trade and investment in the country (Hong, 2014). The use of both pressure and
engagement allowed Japan to align itself with western donors, but continue to reap the
advantages of relations with Myanmar. Sanctions send a message of discontent, but other
forms of engagement can soften that message.
Japan adopted a similar approach to rights violations in China in 1989. The
Communist Party of China’s crackdown on protestors in Tiananmen Square was widely
publicized by outlets like CNN, cementing China’s image as an anti-democratic, antihuman rights regime (Watanabe, 2001). Western donors responded to the government
crackdown by immediately suspending arms sales and high-level visits. Japan, in contrast,
had a mixed response. It did suspend its aid to China, but it portrayed the suspension as a
temporary response to chaos in China and made no mention of human rights or
democracy-related issues (Katada, 2001; Watanabe, 2001). Also, MOFA announced that
Japan wanted to maintain good relations with China (Furuoka, 2006).
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Japan’s middle-of-the-road approach reflected its desire to maintain relations with
China, but also act in concert with other democratic countries. On the one hand, Japan did
not want to be isolated by other countries or go against the U.S.’s plan of imposing
sanctions (Katada, 2001).On the other hand, it did not want to isolate China or damage
Sino-Japanese relations (Watanabe, 2001; Katada, 2001). As a result, it took steps (the
message from the MOFA to the Chinese government and the exclusion of mentions of
human rights issues) to signal that its aid sanctions were not a true rebuke. Based on
Japan’s subdued approach, it is not farfetched to argue that if there had not been intense
international pressure to impose aid sanctions, Japan most likely would not have
implemented them.
Alternative Explanations for Japan’s Behavior
Japan’s historical relationship with many aid recipients in Asia could also explain
Japan’s aversion to using aid sanctions. Japan occupied or fought against aid recipients
like China, the Philippines, and Cambodia during WWII. Because of its past aggressions,
Japan feels that it lacks the legitimacy to criticize Asian countries for human rights
abuses (Furuoka, 2005). Consequently, Japan tries to avoid interfering in domestic affairs
in recipient countries (Asplund and Söderberg, 2017). However, Japan has used aid
sanctions in the past, which suggests that Japan is not completely restricted by its
wartime legacy.
In addition to the historical explanation, some researchers argue that the interests
of the domestic business community restrict Japan’s ability to impose aid sanctions.
Researchers like Kastumata contend that the business sector is a major supporter of
Japan’s current ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). As a result, foreign
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policy is designed in part to benefit that sector (Katsumata, 2006). Aid sanctions could
disrupt economic ties with countries, which would hurt the business sector. In order to
protect business interests, Japan does not impose sanctions (Katsumata, 2006). This
domestic politics explanation is not mutually exclusive with the neorealist explanation for
Japan’s actions. The neorealist view includes the idea that economic and strategic
interests drive aid-giving. Therefore, the argument that business interests, which are part
of the larger category of economic interests, restrain Japan’s human rights diplomacy
could be a part of the neorealist explanation.
Implications for Japan’s Future Human Rights Diplomacy
The neorealist argument can help explain Japan’s past actions, but what are the
implications of this explanation for the prospects of future action against human rights
violations? If Japan’s response to human rights violations is influenced by its economic
and strategic interests, then it is unlikely that it will impose sanctions on Southeast Asian
countries. As this paper has shown, Japan directs most of its aid to Southeast Asian
countries because they are strategically and economically important (Bowers & Grønning,
2017; Okuizumi, 1995). Because these countries are important sources of trade and
diplomatic relations and Japan does not want to jeopardize its relations with them by
imposing aid sanctions, it is unlikely to respond to calls from organizations like Human
Rights Watch to leverage its aid to improve human rights conditions in Cambodia, for
example (Adams, 2019).
On the other hand, Katsumata disputes the idea that imposing aid sanctions would
harm Japan’s relations. He argues that Southeast Asian countries are unlikely to sever
economic relations with a developed country like Japan over aid sanctions (Katsumata,
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2006). Indeed, Japan’s low international profile belies its major power status. It is one of
the largest economies in the world, and it is a major aid donor in Asia (Maswood, 2001).
Because countries are unlikely to sever ties with a major trade partner, Japan could
probably impose aid sanctions without badly damaging its relations. Coupled with
Japan’s tendency to respond to international pressure, this argument presents a more
optimistic view of Japan’s willingness to impose sanctions. However, assuming influence
is a zero-sum game, the rise of China as an alternative source of aid and general
competitor with Japan in Southeast Asia arguably does mean that aid sanctions could
harm Japan’s relations.
China’s Effects on the Cost and Utility of Aid Sanctions
China’s presence as a major aid donor that is unconcerned about human rights
conditions in recipient countries reduces the effectiveness of aid sanctions and increases
the costs of imposing aid sanctions for Japan. Prior to 2008, China was not a major aid
donor. From 2000 to 2008, China’s total aid allocation, concessional and nonconcessional aid, was $68.3 billion. Its average annual aid commitment was $7.59 billion
per year (Pei, 2018). In 2009, however, its annual allocation increased to $38 billion and,
from 2009 to 2014, it provided a total of $54.1 billion in concessional and nonconcessional aid (Pei, 2018). The China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank
of China now provide more aid than the World Bank and five regional development
banks combined (Pacheco Pardo, 2017). In addition to providing large amounts of aid,
China does not appear to take human rights conditions into account when allocating aid
(Takamine, 2006).
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Whereas Japan at least gives lip service to promoting human rights in recipient
countries, the majority of China’s aid goes to autocratic or semi-autocratic regimes (Pei,
2018). China’s willingness to ignore human rights issues reduces the effectiveness of
Japanese aid sanctions, because if Japan decides to impose aid sanctions for human rights
violations, countries can turn to China as a new source of no-strings-attached aid. For
Asian countries, their willingness to gravitate closer to China will be influenced by
factors such as whether they have territorial disputes with China and the depth of their
relationship with Japan. The Philippines, for example, is currently engaged in territorial
disputes with China, and it has strong economic ties with Japan (Cruz De Castro, 2017).
Therefore, the Philippines is unlikely to cut ties with Japan if Japan imposes sanctions in
response to President Duterte’s drug war. At the same time, President Duterte has moved
the country closer to China, and the country began receiving aid from China for
infrastructure in 2016 (Jennings, 2017). Therefore, if Tokyo decided to impose aid
sanctions, China could serve as an alternative source of aid for the Philippines, thereby
diminishing the effectiveness of the sanctions.
Not only does China’s aid policy (potentially) diminish the effectiveness of
Japan’s aid sanctions, it also increases the costs of imposing aid sanctions for Japan.
Japan wants to strengthen its strategic and economic relations with ASEAN countries in
order to create stability in the region and balance against China’s influence (Bowers &
Grønning 2017). Aid sanctions could hinder Japan’s efforts to forge these relationships
and inadvertently push countries toward China. Further, Japan is concerned that China
will replace Japan as a major aid donor in Asia as a part of a wider effort to diminish
Japan’s regional status and influence (Hornung & Reeves, 2017). Thus, China’s presence
58

as an alternative aid donor reduces the appeal and effectiveness of aid sanctions, and by
extension, the likelihood that Japan will impose them on important countries.
Conclusion
How Japan leverages its aid vis-à-vis human rights violations is a product of an
aid policy driven by Japan’s economic and strategic interests. There is no way to know
for certain why Japan acts a specific way, because governments can misrepresent their
actions and actions can be interpreted in multiple ways. Nevertheless, the potential driver
of Japan’s actions is reflected in Japan’s sanctions records. In order to avoid damaging its
relations with strategically and economically important countries, Japan tends not to cut
or reduce aid to these countries. Japan’s tendency to use positive linkage in ASEAN
countries while using negative aid sanctions for unimportant countries is proof of this. If
Japan does impose sanctions, they are meant as more of a warning than a punishment and
quickly removed even when there have been no improvements in human rights conditions
(Furuoka, 2005). Factors such as international pressure can increase the likelihood that
Japan will use aid to promote human rights. However, even international pressure may
not be enough to push Japan to prioritize human rights in other countries over its own
economic and strategic interests. Japan’s tendency to privilege its interests over human
rights considerations, coupled with the presence of China as a major donor, makes it
unlikely that Japan will leverage its power as an aid donor to promote better human
conditions in Southeast Asia.
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Chapter 5

Conclusion
The term “aid” implies a humanitarian or selfless act of giving. Like most
countries’ aid programs, Japan’s aid program is motivated by a number of factors, from
the desire to reduce poverty, to the desire for prestige. This paper argued that out of the
various explanations for why Japan gives aid, the neorealist perspective provides the best
explanation for Japan’s actions as a donor. Japan’s aid-giving is primarily motivated by
economic and strategic interests. As a result, when it comes to promoting human rights
using aid, Japan’s other interests will win out against its commitment to human rights.
Further, Japan provides aid in a way that promotes its own interests over the
needs of recipient countries. However, Japan does use its aid to help recipients. For
example, when Japan funds infrastructure projects in countries like Indonesia and the
Philippines, successful projects produce roads, ports, and bridges that reduce the cost of
trade and make transportation easier for citizens of those countries.
Whether the economic and strategic focus of Japan’s aid program actually hinders
the effectiveness of Japan’s aid is a separate question that could serve as a starting point
for future research on Japan’s aid program. Future researchers could also try to determine
which type of pressure is the most likely to induce Japan to impose aid sanctions on
important recipient countries.
A final point regarding the chapter on Japan’s use of sanctions vis-à-vis human
rights is as follows. The chapter argues that Japan’s decisions regarding when to reduce
or cut aid to countries are strongly influenced by Japan’s pursuit of economic and
strategic interests. The chapter concludes that Japan is unlikely to leverage its aid to
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improve human rights conditions in Southeast Asia. This statement naturally contains a
normative judgement: that Japan should use its bargaining power as a donor to induce
changes in other countries. While it is the author’s opinion that Japan can and should act
in this way, other scholars may rightfully challenge this opinion.
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Berthélemy, J. (2006). Bilateral donors’ interest vs. recipients’ development motives in aid
allocation: Do all donors behave the same? Review of Development Economics, 10(2),
179-194.

62

Bowers, I., & Grønning, B. (2017). Protecting the Status Quo: Japan’s Response to the Rise of
China. In Ross R. & Tunsjø Ø (Eds.), Strategic Adjustment and the Rise of China: Power
and Politics in East Asia (pp. 137-168). Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press.
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1qv5qcn.10
Chenery, H., & Strout, A. (1966). Foreign assistance and economic development. The American
Economic Review, 56(4), 679-733.
Cruz De Castro, R. (2017). Navigating between the Dragon and the Sun: The Philippines’ gambit
of pitting Japan against China in the South China Sea dispute. In Reeves, J., Nankivell,
K., & Hornung, J. (Eds.). Chinese-Japanese competition and the east Asian security
complex : Vying for influence (pp. 178- 197) (Asian security studies). Abingdon, Oxon:
Routledge, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group.
Degnbol-Martinussen, J., & Engberg-Pedersen, P. (2003). Aid : Understanding international
development cooperation. London: Zed Books. Ensign, Margee M. 1992. Doing Good or
Doing Well? : Japan's Foreign Aid Program. New York, New York: Columbia
University Press.
Ensign, Margee M. 1992. Doing Good or Doing Well? : Japan's Foreign Aid Program. New
York, New York: Columbia University Press.
Erickson, A., Kennedy, C. M. (2015). Irregular Forces at Sea: Not “Merely Fishermen”Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia. Retrieved from http://cimsec.org/newcimsec-series-on-irregular-forces-at-sea-not-merely-fishermen-shedding-light-on-chinasmaritime-militia/19624
Feldhoff, T. (2014). Post-Fukushima energy paths: Japan and Germany compared. Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 70(6), 87-96. doi:10.1177/0096340214555108
Fourie, J. (2006). Economic infrastructure: A review of definitions, theory and empirics. South
African Journal of Economics, 74(3), 530-556.
Freedom House. (2018a, January 31). Methodology: Freedom in the World 2018. Retrieved from
https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018

63

Freedom House. (2018b, May 17). Japan. Retrieved from
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/japan
Freedom House. (2019). Freedom in the World Countries. Retrieved from
https://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-world-freedom-2019
Fujikura R., Nakayama M. (2016) Origins of Japanese Aid Policy—Post-war Reconstruction,
Reparations, and World Bank Projects. In: Kato H., Page J., Shimomura Y. (eds) Japan’s
Development Assistance. (pp.39-55). Palgrave Macmillan, London
Furuoka, F. (2005). "Human Rights Conditionality and Aid Allocation: Case Study of Japanese
Foreign Aid Policy." Perspectives On Global Development & Technology 4, no. 2: 125146.
Furuoka, F. (2006). New Challenges for Japan's Official Development Assistance (Oda) Policy :
Human Rights, Democracy, and Aid Sanctions. Kota Kinabalu, Sabah: Penerbit UMS.
Glosserman, B. (2014). Japan: from Muddle to Model? Washington Quarterly, 37(2), 39–53.
https://doi-org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/10.1080/0163660X.2014.926208
Hausman, J. K., & Wieland, J. F. (2014). Abenomics: Preliminary Analysis and Outlook.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1–76. https://doiorg.ccl.idm.oclc.org/10.1353/eca.2014.0001
Hayter, T., & Third World First (Group). (1981). The creation of world poverty. London: Pluto
Press, in association with Third World First.
Hook, S., & Zhang, G. (1998). Japan's aid policy since the cold war: Rhetoric and reality. Asian
Survey, 38(11), 1051-1066.
Hong, Z. (2014). Japan and china: Competing for good relations with Myanmar. The Journal of
East Asian Affairs, 28(2), 1-23.
Horowitz, S. (2015). Why china’s leaders benefit from a nuclear, threatening north Korea:
Preempting and diverting opposition at home and abroad. Pacific Focus, 30(1), 10-32.
Doi:10.1111/pafo.12039

64

Hornung, J. & Reeves, J. (2017) Framing Sino-Japanese competition: Drivers and responses
across the military, economic, and diplomatic sectors. In Reeves, J., Nankivell, K., &
Hornung, J. (Eds.). Chinese-Japanese competition and the east Asian security complex :
Vying for influence (Asian security studies). (pp. 25-50)Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, an
imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group.
Human Rights Watch. (2017, October 27). ("Japan's Abe Should Denounce Philippines'
Murderous 'Drug War'." Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/27/japansabe-should-denounce-philippines-murderous-drug-war.
Human Rights Watch. (2019, January 17). World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Japan.
Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/japan
International Monetary Fund. (2018a, November 28). Japan's Economic Outlook in Five Charts.
Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/11/27/na112818-japanseconomic-outlook-in-five-charts
International Monetary Fund. (2018b, November 28). Japan 2018 Staff Report. Retrieved from
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/11/27/Japan-2018-Article-IVConsultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-Executive-46394
International Monetary Fund. (2019). IMF DataMapper- Real GDP Growth. Retrieved from
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WE
OWORLD
Jain, P. (2014a). National Interests and Japan’s Foreign Policy Aid Policy. Kokusai Monday
(International Affairs), 637. Retrieved from
https://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/publication/2014-12_003-kokusaimondai.pdf
Jain, P. (2014b, December 16). The politics of Japan's new aid charter. Retrieved from
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/12/15/japans-new-aid-charter-shifts-into-domesticand-regional-political-arena/
Jain, P. (2016). Japan's foreign aid: Old and new contests. The Pacific Review, 29(1), 93-113.
doi:10.1080/09512748.2015.1066415
Jennings, R. (2017, November 03). Japan Deepens Economic Support for Philippines in Rivalry
With China. Voice of America. Retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/a/japaneconomic-aid-philippines/4098258.html
65

Kantei. (2013). National Security Strategy of Japan 2013. Retrieved from
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pd
f
Kase, Y. (2003). Japan's nonnuclear weapons policy in the changing security environment:
Issues, challenges, and strategies. World Affairs, 165(3), 123-131.
Katada, S. (2001). Why Did Japan Suspend Foreign Aid to China? Japan's Foreign Aid DecisionMaking and Sources of Aid Sanction. Social Science Japan Journal, 4(1), 39-58.
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/stable/30209652
Katada, S. (2002). Japan's Two-Track Aid Approach: The Forces behind Competing Triads.
Asian Survey, 42(2), 320-342. doi:10.1525/as.2002.42.2.320
Katada, S. (2016). At the crossroads: The TPP, AIIB, and Japan’s foreign economic strategy.
Asia Pacific Issues, 2016(125), 1-8.
Katada, S., Maull, H., & Iguchi, T. (2004). Global Governance : Germany and Japan in the
International System. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate.
Kato H. (2016) Japan’s ODA 1954–2014: Changes and Continuities in a Central Instrument in
Japan’s Foreign Policy. In: Kato H., Page J., Shimomura Y. (eds) Japan’s Development
Assistance. (pp. 1-18). Palgrave Macmillan, London
Katsumata, Hiro. (2006). “Why Does Japan Downplay Human Rights in Southeast Asia?”
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 6 (2): 249–67.
Koppel, B., & Orr, R. (1993). Japan's foreign aid : Power and policy in a new era (Politics in
Asia and the pacific). Boulder: Westview Press.
Kim, H., & Potter, D. (2012). Foreign aid competition in northeast Asia. Sterling, Va.: Kumarian
Press.
Lancaster, C. (2007). Foreign aid : Diplomacy, development, domestic politics. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.

66

Lancaster, C. (2010). Japan’s ODA—naiatsu and gaiatsu: domestic sources and transnational
inﬂuences. In Leheny, D., & Warren, K. (Eds.). Japanese aid and the construction of
global development : Inescapable solutions (Routledge contemporary japan series, 27).
(pp. 29-53). London: Routledge.
Leheny, D., & Warren, K. (Eds.). (2010). Japanese aid and the construction of global
development : Inescapable solutions (Routledge contemporary japan series, 27). London:
Routledge.
Lim, T. (2014). Politics in east Asia : Explaining change and continuity. Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Rienner.
Liska, G. (1960). The new statecraft : Foreign aid in American foreign policy. Chicago U.P;
Cambridge U.P.
Lubin, D. (2019, January 15). How US Monetary Policy Has Tamed China by David Lubin.
Retrieved from https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/how-us-monetary-policyhas-tamed-china-by-david-lubin-2019-01
Lumsdaine, D. (1993). Moral vision in international politics : The foreign aid regime, 19491989. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press
Manning, R. (2016). OECD-DAC and Japan: Its Past, Present, and Future In: Kato H., Page J.,
Shimomura Y. (eds) Japan’s Development Assistance. Palgrave Macmillan, London
Masaru, T. (2009). The emperor’s new clothes : Can japan live without the bomb? World Policy
Journal, 26(3), 63-70. Doi:10.1162/wopj.2009.26.3.63
Maswood, S. J. (2001). Japanese foreign policy and regionalism. In Maswood, S. J. Japan and
East Asian Regionalism. London: Routledge.
Mingst, K. A., & Snyder, J. L. (2017). Essential readings in world politics. New York, NY:
W.W. Norton & Company.
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. (n.d.). History of METI. Retrieved April 27, 2019,
from https://www.meti.go.jp/english/aboutmeti/data/ahistory.html

67

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (1992)."Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter.
“https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/ref1.html.
Ministry of Foreign of Affairs. (2001). Present State of the Piracy Problem and Japan's Efforts.
Retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/piracy/problem0112.html
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2003). "Japan's Official Development Assistance
Charter."https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2014). Chapter 2: Japan’s ODA Disbursements. Retrieved from
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000175896.pdf
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2015a). Official Development Assistance (ODA). Retrieved from
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000138.html
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2015b). Cabinet decision on the Development Cooperation Charter.
Retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000198335.pdf
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2015c). Quality Infrastructure Investment Casebook. Retrieved
from https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000095681.pdf
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2018, September 20). Diplomatic Bluebook 2018 (PDF). Retrieved
from https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/page25e_000237.html
Moyo, D. (2010). Dead aid why aid makes things worse and how there is another way for Africa.
London: Penguin Books.
Nielsen, Richard A. 2013. “Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against
Repressive States.” International Studies Quarterly 57 (4): 791–803.
doi:10.1111/isqu.12049.
Nikitina, L. and Furuoka, F. (2008). Japan’s Foreign Aid Sanctions Policy after the End of Cold
War. Available at: https://mpra.ub.uni- muenchen.de/6757/1/MPRA_paper_6757. pdf.
OECD (2014), "Japan", in Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for
Sustainable Development, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2014-42en.
68

OECD (2016), "Japan", in Development Co-operation Report 2016: The Sustainable
Development Goals as Business Opportunities, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2016-29-en.
OECD (2017), "Japan", in Development Co-operation Report 2017: Data for Development,
OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2017-28-en.
OECD (2018), "Japan", in Development Co-operation Report 2018: Joining Forces to Leave No
One Behind, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2018-34-en.
Oishi, M., & Furuoka, F. (2003). Can Japanese aid be an effective tool of influence? case studies
of Cambodia and Burma. Asian Survey, 43(6), 890-907.
Okaniwa, K. (2015, May 29). Changes to ODA Charter reflect new realities. Retrieved from
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/05/29/commentary/japancommentary/changes-oda-charter-reflect-new-realities/#.XMM1VqRlDYU
Okuda, T. (2017). Railways for the World. Retrieved from https://www.govonline.go.jp/eng/publicity/book/hlj/html/201704/201704_01_en.html
Okuizumi, Kaoru. (1995). “Implementing the Oda Charter: Prospects for Linking Japanese
Economic Assistance and Human Rights.” New York University Journal of International
Law & Politics 27 (2): 367.
Orr, R. (1990). The emergence of Japan’s foreign aid power. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Owa, M. (2017). The changing global aid architecture: an opportunity for Japan to play a
proactive global role? In Asplund, A., & Söderberg, M. (Eds.). Japanese development
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cooperation : The making of an aid architecture pivoting to Asia (European institute of
Japanese studies, East Asian economics & business series, 12). (pp. 72-89). Abingdon,
Oxon: Routledge.
Yoshimatsu, H. (2017). Japan's export of infrastructure systems: Pursuing twin goals through
developmental means. The Pacific Review, 30(4), 494-512.
doi:10.1080/09512748.2016.1276953
72

Younas, J. (2008). Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits. European
Journal of Political Economy, 24(3), 661-674. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.05.003

73

Appendix

There are different ways to classify the types of aid Japan provides. This paper uses
Furuoka’s classification, which identifies four types of aid: bilateral loans, bilateral grants,
bilateral technical assistance, and multilateral aid (Furuoka, 2006). Below is a brief description
of each type of aid for reference.
Bilateral Loans
Bilateral loans or yen loans are loans provided directly to recipient countries at low
interest rates. They can be repaid over a long period of time (Okuizumi, 1995). These loans
primarily finance infrastructure projects in “the land transportation (construction or improvement
of roads, railroads, and bridges), marine transportation (construction or improvement of harbor
facilities), and electrical power (power stations and transmission lines) sectors” (Okuizumi, 1995,
p. 378). Loans can be divided into two categories, project loans and non-project loans. As the
name suggests, project loans go toward specific projects that promote economic or social
development (Furuoka 2006). Non-projects loans, in contrast, are for general improvement of
macroeconomic conditions in recipient countries. The majority of Japan’s bilateral loans are
project loans (Furuoka, 2006).
Bilateral Grants
Bilateral grants are a form of aid that recipient countries do not have to pay back. These
grants typically go towards basic necessities such as agricultural development and medical
services, as well as education and research (Okuizumi 1995). Grants can be divided into two
categories: general grants and technical assistance. General grants mainly go toward projects in
social and cultural sectors (Arase, 2005). Technical assistance, on the other hand, helps transfer
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technological expertise and development techniques to professionals in recipient countries
(Furuoka, 2006).
Bilateral Technical Assistance
Technical assistance can take the form of sending volunteers and experts to recipient
countries, bringing trainees from recipient countries to Japan, conducting development studies,
sending Disaster Relief Teams to disaster-stricken countries, and engaging in “project-type”
technical cooperation (Okuizumi, 1995, p.102). DAC countries are encouraged to provide more
grants than loans, because grants do not have to be paid back and they contribute to poverty
reduction (Lancaster, 2010).
Multilateral Aid
In additional to bilateral loans and grants, Japan provides aid through its contributions
and subscriptions to multilateral institutions like the World Bank (Okuizumi, 1995). Multilateral
institutions get funding from multiple governments and use the money for purposes that benefit
multiple countries. The level of a contribution is decided from year to year, but a subscription is
a fixed amount (Furuoka, 2006).
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